|
|
|
Document Fraud Investigation
Document fraud refers to the manufacture, sale, or use of counterfeit identity documents – such as fake driver’s licenses, birth certificates, Social Security cards, or passports – for immigration fraud or other criminal activity. Document fraud also involves efforts to obtain genuine identity documents through fraudulent means and the alteration of valid documents to be used for fraudulent purposes. These activities have helped millions of illegal aliens unlawfully obtain employment in this country. They have also helped criminals and even terrorists evade detection and embed themselves in our society.
The threat posed by document fraud is exemplified by the fact that at least seven of the 9/11 hijackers obtained genuine Virginia identity documents through fraud. Using these valid ID cards, the hijackers were able to board commercial aircraft for the attacks. Earlier this year, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) deported to El Salvador a man who helped two of the 9/11 hijackers obtain fake Virginia residency certificates allowing them to obtain valid Virginia identity cards for use in boarding the aircraft.
In recent years, document fraud has grown increasingly widespread. The sophistication of these schemes has also grown, as document forgers increasingly use computer software and high-resolution digital scanners to ply their trade. In the past, the primary tools of the counterfeit document trade were typewriters and pieces of plastic. Additionally, the Internet is being used more frequently to market fake documents to customers.
Document Fraud Results in 11 Indictments & 13 Arrests
Office of Counter-Terrorism, Division of Criminal Justice & State Police Track Document Fraud as Part of Continuing Commitment to Public Safety
Attorney General Peter C. Harvey announced the unsealing of 11 State Grand Jury indictments and the issuance of arrest warrants charging 19 New Jersey residents with trafficking in fraudulent documents or using fraudulent documents to obtain valid New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (MVC) driver’s licenses or identification documents. Thirteen of the 19 defendants were arrested yesterday morning and will make first appearances today in Superior Courts in Monmouth and three other counties. Authorities are still seeking the remaining six defendants.
Attorney General Harvey noted that the investigation, coordinated by the Office of Counter-Terrorism and New Jersey State Police and prosecuted by the Division of Criminal Justice, uncovered an underground operation which sold fraudulent Philippine immigration and identification documents to illegal immigrants from that nation. Through the use of fraudulent Philippine passports, drivers’ licenses, and other purportedly official Philippine and immigration documents, the alien residents were able to obtain valid New Jersey MVC driver’s licenses and identification documents in an attempt to establish legitimate residency in the state.
“Stopping document fraud is important to our security. We will continue to aggressively investigate and prosecute people who attempt to obtain legitimate identification such as drivers’ licenses, using false documents,” said Attorney General Harvey. “Recognizing the significant security and law enforcement concerns surrounding document fraud, the Office of Counter-Terrorism, the Division of Criminal Justice, and the New Jersey State Police will continue to target potential dangers to citizens, including the fraudulent use of official documents to obtain valid passports, drivers’ licenses, and other supporting identification.”
The government’s affidavit alleges that the principal frauds pursued by the defendants were asylum fraud, labor certification fraud, and identification document fraud. With regard to asylum, the government’s investigation revealed that several of the defendants were routinely preparing fraudulent asylum applications for Indonesian clients in return for a fee of $2,000 or more. These applications typically contained false claims that the applicant had been raped, sexually assaulted, beaten, or robbed by Muslims in Indonesia on account of the applicant’s Chinese ethnicity or adherence to Christianity. Many of these claims were stock accounts repeated with little variation from application to application. The defendants often supported these claims with counterfeit Indonesian documents, such as birth certificates, baptismal certificates, and police reports. The investigation also revealed that these same defendants coached their clients to exploit the perceived sympathies of the asylum officers and immigration judges assigned to consider the applications. For example, the defendants counseled married immigrants to feature the wife as the lead applicant because the defendants believed asylum officers and immigration judges were more sympathetic to women and less likely to question them aggressively. Applicants were told to cry, plead, and avoid positive references to Indonesia. The defendants also supplied their immigrant clients with Indonesian interpreters who would enhance and correct the testimony clients gave asylum officers during asylum interviews.
"Potential for Fraud in the Visa Program" that focused specifically on nonimmigrants. This document was designed to provide important background information as a prelude to doing further work in this area. To compile the report, OIG Inspectors interviewed staff from INS, the State Department, and the General Accounting Office (GAO). They also reviewed documents from these three agencies as well as relevant legislation. I have copies of this report for members of the Subcommittee and their staff.
Based on our review, we identified four common types of nonimmigrant visa fraud or fraud related to the use of visas:
A person uses fraudulent documents to obtain a legitimate visa. For example, an individual improperly obtains letterhead from a United States business and creates a letter supporting a false reason for traveling to this country. The State Department generally will issue a B-1 visa (temporary visitor for business). In such cases, the INS inspector has no reason to deny the individual entry into the United States.
A person obtains a fraudulent visa. An individual can attempt to use the passport and visa of a person who has similar looks and biographical characteristics (e.g., hair and eye color, age) or can purchase an altered document. Accomplished counterfeiters can alter the biographical data and digitized photographs on even the most secure visas in use today.
An individual may not meet the spirit or intent of the specific visa program. For example, GAO found that 85 percent of individuals requesting religious worker visas are already in the United States and are attempting to adjust status (e.g., from a student visa to a religious worker visa). Many of these individuals are requesting visas through unaffiliated, "storefront churches."
After arriving legitimately, an individual may overstay his/her visa and plan to reside in the United States "permanently."
We did not find comprehensive data related to nonimmigrant visa fraud. In fact, there is very little hard data available to gauge the magnitude of visa fraud, a point noted by GAO in its reports on this subject. For example, the State Department does not track visa refusal rates by visa type. Similarly, INS told us that individuals made 42,299 attempts to enter the United States between October 1992 through May 1993 with fraudulent or altered documents. While INS produced these statistics for an audit report, they are unable to update these figures because they do not maintain centralized statistics on fraudulent or altered documents. This lack of comprehensive statistics hinders the ability of the State Department and INS to appropriately respond to visa fraud.
Based on the information we collected, however, potentially the greatest risk to national security and illegal immigration appears to come from nonimmigrants visiting under the VWPP, a subject I will return to later in my remarks. With the extensive use of VWPP and without comprehensive systems to track or without aggressive efforts to identify nonimmigrant visa fraud, it is difficult to provide accurate risk assessments for the various visa classes.
That said, we offer an opinion in our in-house report of the relative risk for each visa type based on the information we reviewed. We also provide for each visa type a description of the visa, the maximum initial period of admission, the number of visas the State Department issued in FY 1996, the number of arrivals INS recorded in FY 1996, and additional information.
|
|
|
|
|
